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CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND BANKRUPTCY
By

CHARLES

E.

NADLER*

In that field of "business" law that is generally encompassed by the
subjects of Bankruptcy, of Corporations, and of Partnerships, our survey year discloses the following current amendments to existing statutes,

and the several cases decided by the appellate courts of Georgia.
BANKRUPTCY

The recent amendment' to Section 6 oa of the Bankruptcy Act has
drastically affected the law of Georgia as it relates to the question of void-

able preferences created by an unrecorded or belatedly recorded chattel
mortgage or bill of sale to secure debt.2 Prior to this i95o amendment,
the Bankruptcy Act had endowed the trustee in bankruptcy with the hypothetical status of a bona fide purchaser, as well as with the status of a
judgment lien claimant, and with the status of the bankrupt himself. This
195o amendment eliminated the bona fide-purchaser status in determining
the time element involved in a voidable preference. Accordingly, in Georgia and such other states as have recording statutes that their courts have
interpreted as invalidating unrecorded instruments of conveyance only
against subsequent bona fide purchasers and not against judgment lien
holders," an unrecorded chattel mortgage or bill of sale to secure debt,
being superior to a subsequent judgment lien, is not affected as a preference
against the trustee.
The law, however, has expressly not been changed as to security instruments involving real estate; i.e., real estate mortgages, deeds to secure
debt, etc. Nor, by state court interpretation,4 are conditional sales contracts affected. The question of whether this 195o amendment to Section
6oa of the Act is retroactive or not is pending before the Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.'
STATUTES

Corporations.-The i95I General Assembly passed two statutes that
related to private corporations. Both of them repealed existing portions
of Title 22 of the Code. Section 22-1104, which provided for service by
publication on a nonresident corporation having no public place of business,

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

"Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University; Author,
The Law of Bankruptcy (Callaghan & Co., 1948), Georgia Corpoation Law:
Practice, Forms (The Harrison Company, 1949) ; Member Ohio and Georgia Bar
Associations.
64 STAT. 22 (1950), U. S. C. § 96 (Supp. 1951).
For detailed discussion of this entire question, see Nadler, The Effect of Recent
Bankruptcy Amendment on Georgia Security Transactions, 13 GA. B.J. 184 (1950).
See Donovan v. Simmons, 96 Ga. 340, 22 S.E. 966 (1895) ; Mackler v. Lahman, 196
Ga. 535, 27 S.E.2d 35 (1943).
Rhodes v. Jones, 55 Ga. App. 803, 191 S.E. 503 (1937).
For decision appealed from, see In re Harvey Dist. Co., 88 F. Supp. 466 (1950).
(39)
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no office, or agent in the state of Georgia, was repealed' for the primary
reason that our Supreme Court7 held this statute unconstitutional as being
violative of "due process." It was therefore deemed advisable to expunge
this statute from the Code. (Note that a nonresident or undomesticated
corporation which does business in Georgia may be served pursuant to
Section 22-1507; but one that docs not do business in Georgia, can only
be reached through attachment of property within the state.)
The other I95i provision' repealed Code Sections 22-718, 22-719 and
22-720. which had to do with the certification and recording of private
and public corporate bonds. Not only were these provisions of no legal
worth, but they were particularly vicious in that they aggrandized the
''squealer'."
Parcrsihips.-Mentionshould be made of the fact that the 195 1 General Assembly repealed the present statutes relating to limited partnerships and in their place, passed the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
However, because some typographical errors had crept into the bill as
passed, the Governor vetoed the same, but assured us, as did Hon. Frank
Twittv and Hon. Charles L. Gowen, that a corrected bill to the same
effect will be passed at the next session of the legislature.
DECISIONS

Corporations.-In chronological order since our 195o panel, the first
case on corporation law in Georgia was ttlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal"
June S. i 9go. Principally, this was a case involving the principles of the
law of libel and slander. It is mentioned here because the defendant was a
corporation, and one of the issues of the case involved the legal question of
whether, in contemplation of law, the malice of an agent of a corporation
can be imputed to the corporation itself and thus make the corporation
amenable to punitive damages. The facts of the case are interesting in
that they relate to newspaper reports of Mrs. Robert Carpenter's testimony in the divorce proceedings.
Judge Townsend, in a learned and well considered opinion traced the
development of this principle of libel law from English and American cases,
and pointed out that "the Georgia rule is, of course, that the conduct
of the servant is imputable to the master whether or not the act of the
of his authority.
servant was malicious, provided it was within the scope the
damages. ..
increase
." that "his bad faith may be considered to
and that "we can find no sound season for excepting from the general
rule libel cases only," in view of the historical development of the law
hereon."
As to the corporation question, he reiterated the established law that
"a corporation can act only through its agents and that the malice of one
having_ the direction and control of the corporation is, in contemplation of
law, the malice of the corporation.""
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Ga. Laws 1951, p. 16.
In Piggly Wiggly Georgia Co. v. May Inv. Corp., 189 Ga. 477, 6 S.E.2d 579 (1939).
Ga. Laws 1951, p. 99.
82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S.E.2d 802 (1950).
Id. at 335, 60 S.E.2d at 814.
Id. at 334, 60 S.E.2d at 813.
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On June 13, 1950, the right of designated classes of corporations to exercise the right of eminent domain was reiterated in Hagans v. Excelsior
Electric Mevnbership Corp.12 As pointed out by Mr. Justice Hawkins, the
power of eminent domain may be conferred either by a special act creating the corporation or by general acts relating to all corporations of
designated classes. Moreover, such authority to exercise eminent domain
is applicable to corporations chartered prior to, and does not exclude those
chartered after, the enactment by such statutory power.
Next in chronological order is the case of Reid v. Hem phill,3 September
14, 195o. Actually this case involves a question of contract law but is considered in our category because the subject matter of the contract was the
purchase of the entire capital stock of a corporation (Brantlev Products
Co.). The principles of sale are equally applicable to the sale of corporate
stock. Accordingly the court held that where in the course of negotiations
for the purchase of the entire capital stock of a business it was agreed
that the price would be $i,ooo plus the value of an inventorv, $1,5oo
being paid as a deposit, and that at a subsequent date the purchaser and
representatives of the seller would determine the value of the inventory, an
additional $7,500 would be paid by the purchaser, and that payment of the
balance of the purchase price would be on an installment basis, the amounts
of the installments, time of payment, and rate of interest to be agreed
upon at that time, and a formal agreement made showing these terms, and
the purchaser became ill and died, without having done anything after
making the $7,5oo deposit, there was no enforceable agreement between
the purchaser and seller for the purchase of the capital stock of the
business.
Then, came the Supreme Court case of W.O.U.F. .ttlanta RealtY Corp.
v. R.A.C. Realty Co.," October IT,I95o. This case was once before the
Supreme Court, 3 where it was held that an option, unsupported by consideration, could be terminated at any time before its acceptance where
one of the parties was a proposed, but not yet organized, corporation.
This second case involved an assignment of this option contract by the
promoter to the subsequently formed corporation; and the court found
that the promoter-incorporator had no contract which he could transfer
or assign to the corporation after it came into existence and the purported
assignment was of no avail.
On the following week (October 19, 1oo), the Court of Appeals considered the case of Yearwood v. State. Here, again this case comes
into our category of corporation law because the power of stockholders
to bind a corporation as its agents was collaterally involved. Since the
contracts were under seal, the court reiterated the established principle
of Georgia law that the rule of an undisclosed principal standing liable
for the contract of his agent, does not apply when the contract is under
seal.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals decided on November I6, ig5o, and
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

207 Ga. 53, 60 S.E.2d 162 (1950).
82 Ga. App. 391.61 S.E.2d 201 (1950).
207 Ga. 334, 61 S.E.2d 499 (1950).
205 Ga. 154, 52 S.E.2d 617 (1949).
82 Ga. App. 789, 62 S.E.2d 46 (1950).
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affirmed the Superior Court of Fulton County in overruling demurrers by
the corporate defendant in American Thread Co. v. Rochester." This was
a suit for damages by a union organizer which charged that the nonunion
codefend?.nt corporation used two of its employees to attack the organizer
who was passing out leaflets in front of its plant and alleged a conspiracy between the corporation and its two employces. In pointing out
that plaintiff was not invoking the agency rule of respondeat superior, but
is invoking the rule which makes each conspirator the agent and spokesman
of all in the unlawful enterprise, Judge Maclntyre again reminds us that a
corporation must necessarily act by its agents and for such acts it is responsible.
A problem of proper pleading relates to the next case in this group.
"Where a plaintiff in an action against a defendant corporation alleges
dealings between him and the agents of the corporation but fails to name or
describe the agents referred to, it is the right of the defendant corporation
by appropriate special demurrer to call on the plaintiff to do so if there appears in the petition no reason why the plaintiff, who has dealt with such
agents, cannot furnish this information."' 8
Then, in the order of time, is included in the corporation category, only
by way of emphasis, one of the basic characteristics of the corporate
concept.
In MI;'tht Lodge No. 1663 v. Quattelbaum," February 13, 1951, our
Supreme Court pointed out that an unincorporated group cannot sue in
its own name since "no suit can be lawfully prosecuted (in Georgia) save in
the name of a plaintiff having a legal entity, either as a natural or an
artificial person." Accordingly, "the unincorporated Odd Fellows Lodges
did not have capacity to sue out a dispossessory warrant seeking to recover
possession of described realty.""0
Another case that only collaterally relates to corporation law is Oattis v.
West 1'i,. Corp.,2' February 12, 195i. Here a petition was filed against
the West View Corporation and Asa G. Candler, Jr., for a temporary
and permanent injunction against both defendants transferring their property and for the appointment of a receiver. In affirming the Superior
Court of Fulton Countv, our Supreme Court held that the allegations of
the case did not set forth such extraordinary circumstances as would
justify the appointment of a receiver and enjoining defendants from disposing of their property as contemplated by the provisions of Code Sections s5"
io6 and ; ;-3o3. The syllabus opinion by Mr. Justice Atkinson contains citations of cases illustrative of such "extraordinary circumstances."
Again, in the corporation category is Hale-Georgia Minerals Corp. v.
17.
18.
19.
20.

82 Ga. Aup. 873, 62 S.E.2d 602 (1950).
Chelsea Corp. v. Steward. 82 Ga. App. 679, 62 S.E.2d 627 (1950).
207 Ga. 575., 63 S.E.2d 365 (1951).
Cf. Smith v. International L.G.W. Union. 58 Ga. Arn. 26, 197 S.E. 349 (1938),
which interprets GA. CODE §§ 22-409 and 22-414 (1933), as providing under what
circumstances any association of individuals could sue or be sued as an association,
namely, that it must be incorporated or shall have entered the names of its trustees
or officers, together with the name, style and object of the association or society, on
the recmrds of the clerk of the superior court. The correctness of this interpretation is challenged.
21. 207 Ga. 550, 63 S.E.2d 407 (1951).
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Hale,22 March 2, 195 1. This was an action against the corporation by its
vice president and stockholder for salaries under a contract allegedly entered into between the plaintiff and the president of the corporation. Since
the Court of Appeals, Judge Felton, reversed the judgment that the
Bartow County Superior Court rendered in favor of the plaintiff because
"the verdict was not supported by the evidence," we enlisted and thankfully obtained the cooperation of Mr. Roscoe Lowery, law clerk to his
Honor and obtained relevant portions of the transcript in order to evaluate
the headnotes of this case relating to the principles of corporate law involving the power of a president to bind his corporation and the question
of ratification by a corporation.
It would seem that the court was correct in his conclusions that the
'evidence was insufficient to establish that the president of the defendant
,corporation had either the express or implied authority to a course of
dealing to make the contract in question, because it seems well established
*that the president of a corporation, merely by virtue of being such, has
no power to bind the corporation by a contract, but the authority of a
president to contract may be (a) conferred generally, or (b) specially
in an individual case, or (c) the charter or by-laws may give such authority,
,or (d) such authority may be inferred from a course of dealing, and (e)
the corporation may ratify his acts.
As to ratification, knowledge on the part of the corporation, otherwise
than-through knowledge of:the agent whose acts are sought to be ratified,
must be shown. Here the directors knew the transaction as a combination
'of a loan and voluntary contribution of services by an officer.
In the latest case decided May 23, 1951, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the Superior Court of Fulton County on a question relating to the effect of
the consolidation of two corporations upon an action in tort (libel) pend-.
:ing against one of the constituent corporations. In affirming the action of
the trial court in striking the name of the constituent corporation and substituting the name of the resulting corporation, judge Townsend, in Atlanta
3 wrote a very able and exhaustive opinion
Newspapers, Inc. v. Doyal,"
on the effect of mergers and consolidations on the respective assets and
liabilities of the constituent corporations. Since, he noted, that Section
•22-1844 of the Georgia Code expressly carries over to the resulting corporation, the liabilities of each of the constituent corporations, and since
a claim for unliquidated damages in a tort (libel) action is a "debt" within
'said statutory provision, the pending action is not, in effect, an action
•against a "new party" and so it was not necessary to issue a rule nisi but
'the substitution of names could be made instanter upon motion.
Partnerships.-Thefirst case of our survey year in the category of partnerships directly involved a question of pleading. Upon the reasoning
that the error of naming a nonexistent corporation and permitting an
amendment to change such defendant to a partnership defendant, is not
a substitution of a new partv but is merely a misdescription of a firm name
(the firm name being equally suited to a corporation or to a partnership)
and that there is no change of party, but the same individuals are still
'22. 83 Ga. App. 561,63 S.E.2d 920 (1951).
23. 84 Ga. App. 122, 65 S.E.2d 432 (1951).
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before the court, our Court of Appeals, in Bell v. dlyers," decided July
7, i95o, shows how liberal its policy is in permitting amendments to process. Thus, a petition in a suit against the "Coca-Cola Bottling Company, a
foreign corporation" is amendable by striking the words, "a foreign corporation," and alleging that the company is a partnership composed of
named individuals. How can such a holding be reconciled with the established principle that a corporation is a legal entity, a separate entity, as
is also a partnership?
The next case was Simpson v. Pethel,15 September 14, i95o. Fundamentally this action involves the law of negotiable instruments in that
plaintiff's petition was dismissed because it failed to allege presentment
and notice of dishonor, or facts excusing such notice, all as contemplated
by Georgia Code Sections 14-707, 14-708, 14-7io and 14-712. It finds itself
in the partnership category because the action sought to recover payment of
a check drawn against partnership funds by the defendant's former partner
more than seven months before his death. It would seem that here is
another instance where the law looks upon a partnership as a separate,
rather than an aggregate, entity.
The third partnership case involved a suit for malicious prosecution and
one of the issues related to the legal status of the codefendants. In
holding them to be copartners, Judge Worrill affirmed the lower court
and again enunciated one of the recognized definitions that a partnership
is "a contract of two or more competent persons to place their money,
effects, labor and skill, or some or all of them, in lawful commerce or
business, and to divide the profit and bear the loss in certain proportions"
and that a partnership "may arise from a joint ownership, use, and enjoyment of the profits of undivided property, real or personal. Code §
75-101.'2"

Then came the case of Evans Motors of Georgia, Inc. v. Hamilton" on
December 5, i95o. Through a maze of confusing and contradictory testimony involving the determination of what constitutes a partnership under
Georgia statutes and judicial interpretations, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court in holding that where one party to an oral agreement has
only an interest in the net profits and no interest in or liability for losses
of the enterprise, he is not, even as to third parties, a partner, and there
is no "partnership." In coming to this conclusion, Judge Worrill properly
examined the factual situation in the light of such standard tests of what
is a partnership as "community of interest" and "community of control."
Next in chronolgical order is Graham v. Raines, 8 March 2, 1951, and
relates to a trover action by an assignee of one of the former partners asserting claim to peanuts belonging to the partnership and delivered tothe defendants. The court held that "after dissolution of a partnership,
and a division between the two partners of the firm assets remaining after
the payment of all indebtedness, and after an agreement between the
partners that a claim for personalty against a third party, a part of the
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

82 Ga. App. 92, 60 S.E.2d 523 (1950).
82 Ga. App. 374, 61 S.E.2d 154 (1950).
Peppas v. Miles, 82 Ga. App. 438, 61 S.E.2d 429 (1950).
82 Ga. App. 735, 62 S.E.2d 390 (1950).
83 Ga. App. 581, 64 S.E.2d 98 (1951).
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firm assets, would be divided equally between them, the partners thereafter
became tenants in common, insofar as such personalty or their claim therefor was concerned, and it was permissible for an assignee of the interest in
such personalty and of his claim therefor of one of such cotenants to sue in
trover for the recovery of a one-half undivided share of such property without joining the other cotenant, and without suing in the name of the dissolved partnership." 9
Judge Worrill went to great pains to point out that the Georgia rule
is otherwise where the action is based on a partnership contract and is,
therefore, ex contractu as distinguished from ex delicto.
The last case involving partnerships is Columbus Wine Co. v. Sheffield,"
January 25, i95I. Since the question of partnership herein was minor and
collateral, the only value of this case is the reiteration of the definitely established principle of partnership law that every member of a partnership
is primarily liable for the partnership debts, and that an agreement between
two partners that one of them shall assume and pay all debts of the
partnership upon its dissolution is not within the Statute of Frauds nor
need be in writing.
29. See GA. CODE § 3-111 (1933).

SO. 83 Ga. App. 593, 64 S.E.2d 356 (1951).

